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Job mobility and wage mobility of high- and low-paid workers
1 Introduction
Job mobility is an important determinant of lifetime wage growth. Topel and Ward (1992) suggest
that job mobility accounts for one third of the overall wage growth in the early stages of the working
career. Numerous studies have examined further this relationship. In these studies, the effect of job
mobility on wage growth is presumed to be independent from the position in the wage distribution.
However, the decision of a worker to change job depends crucially on the level of the initial wage.
Explaining individual decisions on job turnover, on-the-job search theory suggests that both the
hazard rate of leaving the current job, and the difference between the current wage and the
reservation wage1 are decreasing with the current wage (Mortensen, 1986; van den Berg, 1992).
A low-paid worker expects more job changes in his working life than a high-paid worker in order
to improve his earnings. Therefore, compared to a high-paid worker, a low-paid worker chooses
a reservation wage that is relatively higher than the current wage (van den Berg, 1992). In this
way, the low-paid worker reduces the costs related to the job-change, as he can attain his preferred
life-time earning level in fewer steps. Should workers receive wage offers relatively close to their
reservation wage, then the wage gains from a job change are relatively higher for the low-paid
than for the high-paid worker.
The wage effects of the different types of job change (within the firm or with another employer)
have received little attention in economic research. According to various theories, wage careers
within firms deviate from the assumptions of the fully competitive labour market model. Em-
ployers in large firms often pay a wage exceeding the market wage, in order to maintain the most
productive workers to the firm. Therefore, we expect positive returns to job changes in the inter-
nal labor market. However, since high-paid workers are more involved in training (and therefore
develop more firm-specific skills) they are expected to derive more utility from a promotion or a
job shift within the same firm, than low-paid workers.
The aim of this paper is to compare the effect of voluntary job mobility on wage growth for the
low- and the high-paid worker, accounting for the different mechanisms driving these two groups
1The reservation wage refers to the lowest wage that the worker accepts in order to leave his current job.
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to change job. From a policy perspective, this is an important issue since the demand for low-
skilled or low-paid employment has considerably decreased over the past decades (Acemoglu, 2003).
Moreover, the creation of jobs of a given quality and earnings level (i.e. high-level jobs) is contended
to be a significant policy tool to tackle earnings inequality within modern European labour markets
(Salverda et al., 2001).
The data we use come from two countries with very different labour market conditions: the UK
and Germany. We are able, thereby, to investigate our research question in two different labour
markets, a liberal and regulated one. Our econometric model is a panel regression model with a
Heckman type two-step estimation procedure in order to tackle the endogeneity of job mobility.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents shortly the findings of the
relevant literature. The data are discussed in Section 3. The model used for estimation is developed
and explained in Section 4. Section 5 reports on the results from estimation of this model. Section
6 concludes.
2 Previous empirical findings
Various theoretical models have tried to explain the relationship between job mobility and wage
growth. The mover-stayer model (Blumen et al., 1955) suggests that “bad” workers tend to
change jobs, and therefore, job mobility has a negative effect on wages. The job-search model
(Mortensen, 1986) argues instead that a separation has a positive effect on wages. This happens
because the separation takes place when the worker encounters a better wage offer. In both models,
the productivity of the workers is fixed and known ex-ante. Therefore, these two models suggest
that controlling for individual and job heterogeneity should eliminate the effect of job mobility
on wages. The job-matching model relaxes the assumption of ex-ante known productivity. It
suggests that wages are adjusted within a job, as information about the quality of the match is
revealed. A separation can be the result of such an adjustment. The “raiding” model of Lazear
(1986) suggests that current wages serve as a proxy for workers’ productivity. Since productivity
is not known ex-ante, the job-matching and the “raiding” model allow for an effect of job mobility
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on wages even after controlling for individual and job heterogeneity.
With respect to this feature, empirical findings are more in accordance with the predictions
from the job-matching and the “raiding” model (Light and McGarry, 1998; Munasinghe and
Sigman, 2004). Voluntary changes of employer are found to produce wage gains in the US (Royalty,
1998; Gladden and Taber, 2000) and in Europe (Perez and Sanz, 2005). However, these gains
decrease with age as well as with tenure, and with the number of job changes (Farber, 1994; Light
and McGarry, 1998).
The effect of within-firm job changes on wage growth has received less attention in economics,
whereas within-firm mobility is found to account for a considerable part of the life cycle earnings
variation (McCue, 1996). Only few studies, such as Lazaer (1999) argue that promotions have an
immediate positive effect on wages. Hannan et al. (1990) find that within-firm job mobility does
not result into faster wage growth for West-German workers, while Baker et al. (1994) find that
the wage premium of an in-firm promotion in the US is significantly less than the average wage
disparity between the same job positions.
However, these studies only estimate an average wage effect. To our knowledge, no study has
ever differentiated the effect of a job change on wages between the different parts of the wage
distribution. Such differences, as we argued above are likely to exist.
3 Data and main concepts
We use data from the UK and Germany covering the period 1991-2004: the British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) and the German Socio-economic Panel (GSOEP).2 These two countries are
included in the analysis as their labour markets differ considerably with respect to the institutions
affecting job mobility and wage growth. Efficiency in the liberal British labour market is sought
through increased rates of job mobility and low levels of state intervention. On the contrary, the
German labour market is featured by a high level of job protection and regulation. Jobs require
2The BHPS data (Taylor et al., 2006) were made available by the Data Archive at Essex University. The
GSOEP (Wagner et al., 1993) was provided by the German Institute for Economic Research. We only use data for
the former West Germany as the labour market of East Germany differed considerably from the West German one,
especially at the beginning of the 1990s.
3
Job mobility and wage mobility of high- and low-paid workers
certain qualifications provided by education or vocational training (apprenticeship). Collective
bargaining covers about 70% of the West-German workers in the private sector. The relevant
fraction for the UK is only 22%.3 Moreover, the macroeconomic performance of the two countries
shows considerable variation since the early 1990s. The UK economy was engaged in a much
stronger economic upturn than the German economy, which had to face the costs of reunification.
This is reflected in higher GDP growth rates, lower unemployment rates and higher average wage
growth in the UK compared to Germany.
The sample is restricted to full-time working males between 25 and 55 years of age. Specifically,
we select males that declared paid employment to be their main activity and that work at least 35
hours a week. We excluded the self-employed and the apprentices. Our main economic variable is
the gross hourly wage.4 This hourly wage is calculated from the last month’s earnings from paid
employment, and the usual number of hours worked per week. Monthly pay includes overtime but
no other kind of additional payments.5 We define as low- and high-paid workers those belonging
to the lowest and the highest quartile of the wage distribution, respectively.
Following similar approaches in the literature (Perez and Sanz, 2005), we define as voluntary,
the job changes that are direct, without an intervening unemployment or inactivity spell. Since
our focus is on voluntary separations, involuntary job changes are excluded from the analysis.
4 Empirical model
When investigating the effect of job mobility on wage growth, the main econometric issue to be
tackled is the possible endogeneity of job mobility. We apply a two-step procedure of the Heckman
type to correct for this possible endogeneity: first, we model the probability of job mobility; second,
we estimate a wage regression that includes the correction terms for endogeneity derived from the
first step.
3These percentages refer to 2000 and come from the European Industrial Relations Observatory (EIRO).
4Unfortunately, these panel surveys offer no information on the reservation wage. Therefore, we rest on the
assumption that the workers accept job offers with a wage close to their reservation wage.
5Including additional payments (bonus, fringe benefits) would be definitely informative since the high paid
might receive more of these payments than the low paid. However, in GSOEP information on this payments is only
available in a yearly basis and therefore it does not necessarily refer to the current job.
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In the first step, we apply a random-effects panel multinomial logit model for job mobility,
distinguishing between no job change, external (between-firms) job change and internal (within-
firm) job change. Non-pay related components of job satisfaction are used as the exclusive variables
that allow the identification of the model. For the UK, we use the satisfaction for working hours and
for the work content. For Germany, we use the variable indicating how much the worker is worried
about job security.6 The model also controls for a number of observed characteristics (see note
in Table 2). Parameters are estimated by maximum likelihood using LatentGold (Vermunt and
Magidson, 2005).7 From this first-step estimation, we retrieve selection terms (control functions)
in a way analogous to the Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979). We have one such term to
control for the endogeneity of an external job change (λ1), and one to control for the endogeneity
of an internal job change (λ2). The control functions are defined as proposed by Dubin and
McFadden (1984).
The second step of the estimation procedure is a fixed-effects linear wage-growth regression,
where we correct for the endogeneity of job mobility.8 This wage regression model can be written
as:
wit+1 − wit = x′itβ +
2∑
j=0
p′ijt
(
bj +
2∑
k=0
(
d′ik(t+1)cjk
))
+ λ1itδ′1 + λ2itδ
′
2 + ui + εit . (1)
where wit is the natural logarithm of the wage of individual i at time period t, xit is a vector
of covariates (see note in Table 2). p′ijt represents the position in the wage distribution, and
can take three values (low, middle, high). The categorical variable for the job change appears
in the equation as dummies (d′ik(t+1)) indicating whether no change, an external or an internal
job change within the firm takes place between t and t+ 1.9 To capture the differentiating effect
of the job change in the various parts of the wage distribution, we interact the dummies for the
6We also tested other instruments, such as the housing tenure status, and the overall satisfaction with the job.
The results we obtained were similar.
7Details on the estimation can be provided on request.
8In the two steps of the estimation we use different panel models. This is because there is no way of estimating
a fixed-effects multinomial logit model. Moreover, in the primary equation the Hausman test rejects the null
assumption of the joint coefficients’ equality of the fixed- and random-effects model, suggesting that the fixed
effects specification should be preferred.
9If we restrict p0k = p1k = p2k=0, then we get a simpler model, where the effect of job change is considered
independent of the position in the wage distribution.
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job change with the dummies for the position in the distribution. For identification, we assume
that b0 = 0 and cj0 = 0. The term ui represents the individual-specific unobserved effects and
εit the idiosyncratic error. The term εit is assumed to be normally distributed with mean 0 and
uncorrelated with ui. The vector β and the scalars bj , cjk, δ′1 and δ
′
2 are the regression parameters
to be estimated.
5 Results
Table 1 presents the fraction of job movers as well as the relative wage growth between t and t+1
averaged over the years, with a breakdown according to the initial position in the wage distribution.
It shows that the rates of job mobility and the corresponding wage returns are higher in the liberal
British labour market than in the regulated German labour market. Furthermore, Table 1 indicates
that in both countries, the low paid tend to change employer more often that the high paid, while
the high paid change jobs within the firm more often than the low paid. The average relative
gain for the low paid, in terms of year-to-year wage growth, is larger than for the high paid. On
average, high-paid workers do not experience any significant relative change in their wage.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 2 shows the main results of the first-step regression for job mobility. The main finding
is that the probability of changing a job appears to vary across the different parts of the wage
distribution only in the UK. We find that the higher the position in the distribution the lower
the probability of changing employer. The probability of an internal job change is higher for the
middle than for the upper or the lower part of the wage distribution. Our exclusive variables
(satisfaction for working hours and satisfaction with work content in the UK and worry for job
security in Germany) are strongly significant for external mobility. These variables have also the
expected effect: the more satisfied a worker is, the lower the probability of changing employer.10
Correction for unobserved heterogeneity appears to be important in both countries: unobserved
10In Table 2, for the UK, we present only the results for working hours satisfaction. The results for work content
satisfaction in the UK are similar. Results for this variable as well as for the other covariates are omitted from
Table 2. The full results can be obtained from the first author. Despite the lack of significance for the in-firm
mobility equation, additional tests on the wage equation confirmed the adequacy of the instruments.
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individual characteristics such as ability and search effort affect the likelihood of a job change.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
In the second step, we estimated four versions of the wage regression (Table 3): 1) a simple
fixed-effects regression; 2) a fixed-effects model correcting for the endogeneity of job mobility; 3) a
fixed-effects model controlling for the position in the wage distribution; and 4) and a fixed-effects
model controlling for both the position in the wage distribution and endogeneity of job mobility.11
For both countries, models 1 and 2 perform rather weakly. The coefficients of the endogeneity
correction terms are significant in model 2, which verifies the findings of previous studies. However,
the endogeneity terms become insignificant in model 4 that corrects for the position in the wage
distribution. Thus, our findings suggest that the endogeneity of job mobility in the wage equation
is correlated with the position in the wage distribution. According to the aforementioned results,
the discussion on the estimated results is based on model 3 for both countries.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Table 3 verifies that the low-paid workers experience, on average, a higher relative wage growth
than the high-paid workers, regardless of whether they change jobs or not.12 Moreover, the effect
of a job change on the wage growth is different between these two groups of workers. The relevant
interactions terms are constructed in such a way that they can be interpreted in terms of the
difference in the wage return between the relevant groups of movers and stayers. These interaction
terms indicate that when changing employers, the low-paid workers experience wage gains, while
their higher-paid colleagues have the same wage growth as those staying in the same job. This
difference between the low- and the high-paid workers is similar in the UK and in Germany.
Within-firm mobility produces gains only for the British low-paid workers. This finding is not
surprising, as within-firm job changes do not necessarily refer to promotions. They also include
11In the models that correct for endogeneity (models 2 and 4) we bootstrapped the standard errors. This is
because the regression includes predictions from the first-step regression, which could bias the standard errors.
12This result should not be interpreted as an indication of decreasing earnings inequality, which would contradict
the findings of several studies. This is due to the fact that we only observe part of the overall wage mobility, as we
exclude workers moving in and out of paid employment.
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job changes at the same level and demotion.13 Furthermore, as indicated by Baker et al. (1994),
a wage gain from a job promotion may be shifted more into the future. Additional computations
on our data showed that wage gains for high-paid workers several years after the job change are
indeed larger than the immediate gains.
6 Conclusion
Most studies on the effect of job mobility on wage growth implicitly assume that this effect is the
same at all wage levels. Using panel data for the UK and Germany, we showed that the probability
of a job change is different for the low- and the high-paid worker in the UK, and that the relative
wage returns to job changes are higher for the low-paid worker in both countries. The latter
finding is in accordance with the predictions of on-the-job search theory (van den Berg, 1992).
From a policy perspective, a voluntary change of employer might be a good career move for the
low-paid worker.
Our study also verifies the ambiguity of the wage effect of internal job changes. In the liberal
UK labour market, the low-paid worker can benefit by changing job within the firm. However, no
effect is found in the regulated German labour market. It requires more scrutiny to disentangle
the dissimilar effect of the various types of job changes on wage growth.
Further research could also shed more light on the alternative explanations of why people
change jobs. This is particularly important for the high-paid workers. Our study suggests that
changing job does not, on average, result in higher hourly wages for this group of workers. These
workers are likely to benefit more often from bonus payments that are payed on a yearly basis, or
from other forms of fringe benefits.
13For the UK, two thirds of internal job changes refer to promotions. For Germany, we cannot distinguish
promotions from other types of internal job changes.
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Tables
Table 1: Proportion of job movers and stayers, and associated relative wage growth
(in percentages)
UK Germany
Stayers Movers Stayers Movers
External In-firm External In-firm
Low paid
proportion 80.2 10.8 9.0 92.0 6.8 1.2
wage change 13 27 24 12 14 14
Medium
paid
proportion 80.1 7.3 12.6 93.4 4.6 2.0
wage change 5 8 10 4 6 8
High paid
proportion 78.4 6.3 15.2 92.3 4.7 3.1
wage change 0 1 3 1 2 1
Total
proportion 79.8 8.0 12.3 92.8 5.2 2.1
wage change 6 13 11 5 7 6
cases 12,968 1,300 1,999 11,404 639 258
A worker is low paid when his earnings belong to the lowest quartile of the hourly wage distribution and high
paid when his earnings belong to the upper quartile of the wage distribution. The worker is middle paid
if his earnings are in the second or third quartile of the distribution.
Table 2: First step regression
Random effects multinomial logit model for the job change (robust standard error)
UK Germany
External movers Internal movers External movers Internal movers
Hours satisfaction
(reference category 1
- not satisfied at all)
value 2
-0.170 0.025
(0.229) (0.214)
value 3
-0.265 -0.044
(0.200) (0.186)
value 4 -0.410∗∗ 0.076
(neutral) (0.202) (0.186)
value 5
-0.499∗∗∗ 0.128
(0.196) (0.181)
value 6
-0.484∗∗∗ 0.057
(0.195) (0.181)
value 7 -0.713∗∗∗ 0.204
(completely satisfied) (0.219) (0.192)
Worry about
job security
(very concerned)
Somewhat
concerned
-0.533∗∗∗ -0.062
(0.107) (0.236)
Not concerned
at all
-0.710∗∗∗ -0.190
(0.111) (0.240)
Position in the
distribution
(low paid)
medium paid
-0.195∗∗ 0.159∗∗ 0.000 -0.077
(0.086) (0.073) (0.087) (0.191)
high paid
-0.313∗∗∗ 0.012 0.033 0.248
(0.117) (0.091) (0.129) (0.239)
Constant
0.426 -2.208∗∗∗ 0.499 -5.783∗∗∗
(0.967) (0.753) (1.068) (2.069)
Random effect
0.911∗∗∗ -0.686∗∗∗ -0.536∗∗∗ 1.605∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.050) (0.094) (0.127)
Log likelihood -11,397.50 -5,281.75
Reference categories in brackets
The following variables are included as controls in the regression: a dummy for married, age in years, age squared, labour
market experience in months, experience squared, education with respect to high school (low,high-school, tertiary), a
dummy for formal training the past year, the industry sector (sic level 1), the firm size (small, medium and large firms),
the type of contract (permanent/temporary), tenure in months, yearly dummies, and the regional unemployment rate.
For Germany, we also included a dummy indicating whether the worker has ever acquired apprenticeship qualifications.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table 3: Second step regression
Fixed effects model for wage growth
(robust standard error)
UK Germany
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mills ratios
Mills ratio for
external job change
0.042∗∗∗ 0.002 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.004)
Mills ratio for
in-firm job change
-0.114∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.002
(0.010) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Position in the distribution (low paid)
Medium paid
-0.260∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗ -0.217∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005)
High paid
-0.521∗∗∗ -0.520∗∗ -0.441∗∗∗ -0.439∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.012) (0.007) (0.009)
Job change (no change)
External job
change
0.031∗∗∗ 0.018∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.010)
External change
* low paid
0.065∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.020) (0.011) (0.014)
External change
* medium paid
-0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010)
External change
* high paid
-0.033∗∗ -0.035 0.010 0.005
(0.016) (0.021) (0.015) (0.019)
In-firm job
change
0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ -0.008 -0.005
(0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010)
In-firm change
* low paid
0.051∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗ -0.023 -0.017
(0.014) (0.018) (0.024) (0.025)
In-firm change
* medium paid
0.008 0.007 -0.004 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.015) (0.012)
In-firm change
* high paid
0.012 0.011 -0.024 -0.029∗
(0.011) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015)
Constant
0.801 0.412 0.245 0.235 0.346∗∗∗ 1.334∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗ 0.121
(0.817) (2.306) (0.736) (2.169) (0.106) (0.155) (0.094) (0.164)
R2 0.006 0.036 0.196 0.196 0.014 0.019 0.223 0.220
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
The list of the control variables is the same as in the first step regression.
Reference categories in brackets
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